Each election cycle brings with it an opportunity to study the way in which classic ethical positions play out in public discourse. Of particular interest is the persuasive power of consequentialist ethics as a voting nears. Consequentialist ethics - such as utilitarianism - suggest that individuals should base their ethical decisions on the outcomes of their actions. In contrast, a deontological ethics - such as Kant's Categorical Imperative - suggests that individuals should act according to moral rules.
How this debate plays out in reference to elections is often that those operating from a consequentialist perspective accuse those in the deontological camp of failing to consider the practical implications of their votes - of wasting the vote, spoiling the election, or placing their own moral purity above the needs of others. This is most clearly seen either in the case of those not voting for the "right" candidate of a particular party or those voting outside the other's party of choice altogether. There are at least two main objections, however, to the consequentialist logic in this case.
How this debate plays out in reference to elections is often that those operating from a consequentialist perspective accuse those in the deontological camp of failing to consider the practical implications of their votes - of wasting the vote, spoiling the election, or placing their own moral purity above the needs of others. This is most clearly seen either in the case of those not voting for the "right" candidate of a particular party or those voting outside the other's party of choice altogether. There are at least two main objections, however, to the consequentialist logic in this case.
First, consequentialism demands that an actor presumes to know the practical future outcomes of a decision and that this knowledge matters more than what would appear to be the more principled choice in the moment. The problem, of course, is that one simply cannot know the future with perfect certainty. The consequentialist is essentially a gambler, betting that their discernment of the future is the most accurate. What moral high ground can someone taking such a position really stand upon in condemning those who choose to vote based on their convictions?
The second flaw in consequentialist election logic is to place the burden of this future on each and every voter, in spite of the fact that we know (or should know) that individual votes matter very little. And yet, impassioned pleas (or worse) are nonetheless directed to friends, family members, and acquaintances that if those others do not agree to make the "correct" choice then they will be to blame for all the ills to come as a result. But again, if one cannot truly know the future and one's vote cannot determine the outcome of any one election, why does the consequentialist argument hold so much sway in political conversation?
Its power rests on fear - fear of the negative outcomes predicted by others and fear of being at fault. But fear does not motivate us to our highest selves and should not be the rationale for why we participate in choosing those to hold the highest offices. We will never be able to see perfectly into the future, but we can come closer to knowing whether the decision we make right now is one that sits well with our moral compass. That is a position worth taking into the ballot box.
The second flaw in consequentialist election logic is to place the burden of this future on each and every voter, in spite of the fact that we know (or should know) that individual votes matter very little. And yet, impassioned pleas (or worse) are nonetheless directed to friends, family members, and acquaintances that if those others do not agree to make the "correct" choice then they will be to blame for all the ills to come as a result. But again, if one cannot truly know the future and one's vote cannot determine the outcome of any one election, why does the consequentialist argument hold so much sway in political conversation?
Its power rests on fear - fear of the negative outcomes predicted by others and fear of being at fault. But fear does not motivate us to our highest selves and should not be the rationale for why we participate in choosing those to hold the highest offices. We will never be able to see perfectly into the future, but we can come closer to knowing whether the decision we make right now is one that sits well with our moral compass. That is a position worth taking into the ballot box.